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Abstract 
The amendment to the Monetary Law Act in 2002 defines “economic and price stability” as one of Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka’s core objectives. Using a standard aggregate demand – aggregate supply model with 
varying policy preferences this paper discusses the achievability of “economic and price stability” when the 
economy is faced with aggregate demand disturbances and aggregate supply disturbances. As demand 
disturbances move both output and prices in the same direction, monetary policy can counter the shock thus 
achieving output and price stability simultaneously. However, supply disturbances move output and prices 
in opposite directions, and the central bank may not be able to maintain both output and price stability. In 
such circumstances, extreme policy aimed purely at price stability aggravates the effect of the supply 
disturbance on the real economy. This confirms that, while price stability must remain the focus of a 
modern central bank, the stability of the real economy cannot be totally ignored in monetary policymaking.   
Keywords: central banking, monetary policy, supply disturbances, demand disturbances 
JEL classification: E10, E52, E58, E61 
Introduction 
I have often been intrigued by the amendment to the Monetary Law Act in 2002 which defined “economic 
and price stability” as one of CBSL’s key objectives particularly because it somewhat differs from the 
perception that a central bank must aim at maintaining nothing but price stability. The objective of 
“economic and price stability” has been further clarified in Wijewardena (2007), citing the then Governor 
A.S.Jayawardena: “if you have only price stability, then you would fall into the trap of attempting to 
stabilize a price index which is not what is meant by price stability, in the context of a central bank. The 
attainment of price stability for a central bank means elimination of both excess demand and excess supply 
in the market so that the market is free of potential inflationary or deflationary pressures”(p.1). 
Wijewardena further argues that “price stability, in the context of a central bank, means the maintenance of 
a zero excess demand or excess supply in the total economy, commonly known as the macro economy. In 
that situation, all incentives for prices to rise or fall are non-existent. What is meant by economic stability 
in the broad objective of the Central Bank is the attainment and maintenance of this state. A central bank 
cannot be complacent until it has attained this level of stability. The way to attain that level of stability is to 
control the nominal aggregate demand by controlling the main force affecting that aggregate demand: the 
quantity of money in the hands of people” (pp.2-3).  
Graphically, it is straightforward to illustrate Wijewardena’s argument.  In Figure 1 the 
macroeconomic equilibrium is at E0 where the aggregate demand curve (AD0) meets the aggregate supply 
(AS0), and the price level and output are at (P0) and (Y0), respectively. As an example, a disturbance that 
shifts the aggregate demand curve to AD1’’ results in an excess demand for goods and services at the given 
price level and given aggregate supply. To eliminate the excess demand, the price level needs to increase to 
P1’’ thus generating inflation. A central bank that aims at price stability may prefer to reinstate the aggregate 
demand curve back at the original level of AD0 through controlling interest rates and/or money in the 
economy, thereby eliminating excess demand, eliminating excess supply, stabilising prices, and stabilising 
                                                          
1 / I have immensely benefited from numerous conversations with my PhD supervisor at the University of Manchester on issues 
closely related to those discussed in this paper. Any errors and omissions are mine.   
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output as well. As Wijewardena (2007) states, “[w]hen there is no excess demand or excess supply, then 
the macroeconomy is said to be in balance. Such a balance eliminates the pressure on prices to change” 
(p.3). 
Figure 1: Economic Equilibrium and Disequilibria under Aggregate Demand Shocks 
 
In the above example, achieving price stability and output stability through monetary policy is not 
conflicting with one another. However, in the case of an aggregate supply disturbance, e.g. a shift of the 
aggregate supply curve to AS1’ in Figure 2, the policymaker is faced with a trade-off between stabilising 
prices or stabilising output. In such circumstances achieving “economic and price stability” may not be as 
straightforward as in the previous case. According to Mishkin (2008), “[i]n this case, because tightening 
monetary policy to reduce inflation can lead to lower output, the goal of stabilizing inflation might conflict 
with the goal of stabilizing economic activity.” (p. 5) 
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Figure 2: Economic Equilibrium and Disequilibria under Aggregate Supply Shocks 
 
The fact that in the case of aggregate demand disturbances prices and output move in the same 
direction and that aggregate supply disturbances move them in opposite directions as shown in the above 
graphs appears to be very much applicable to Sri Lanka. Figure 3 plots the consumer price gap and real 
GDP gap as measured using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (see details of data in the Appendix). Also shaded in 
the Figure are the episodes identified by Nordhaus (2007) and Blanchard and Galí (2007) as world oil price 
shocks, which here is taken as the proxy for aggregate supply disturbances. During many of these episodes 
it can be observed that prices and output have moved in the opposite directions, and this is not true only 
during the 2002-2005 episode.   
Figure 3: Price Gap and GDP Gap against World Oil Price Shock Episodes 
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In Figure 4, aggregate demand shocks are proxied by broad money above a Hodrick-Prescott trend, 
and shown by the shaded area. It is observed that during the period between 1980-1985, both output and 
prices have been above trend and have been closely associated with positive innovations to money supply. 
Positive money supply shocks can again be seen associated with 1995-1999 and the most recent period in 
the sample where prices and output are above trend. The unshaded area refers to broad money below trend 
(or negative aggregate demand shock periods), and indeed associated with reduced output and prices as 
expected in the case of a negative demand shock. The unexplained effect of the 2002-2005 oil price shock 
is probably due to the fact that it was eclipsed by monetary disturbances during the period. Broadly 
speaking, the behaviour of prices and output in Sri Lanka has been affected by predominant shocks of the 
time, and Figures 3 and 4 provide short-hand evidence in this regard.    
 
Figure 4: Price Gap and GDP Gap against Aggregate Demand Disturbances  
(Shaded area – positive disturbances, unshaded area – negative disturbances) 
 
The aim of this paper is not to discuss whether “economic and price stability” are two sides of the 
same coin or two entirely different objectives. Indeed, many argue that “there is considerable agreement 
among academics and central bankers that the appropriate loss function [of a central bank] both involves 
stabilizing inflation around an inflation target and stabilizing the real economy, represented by the output 
gap” (Svensson, 2000). Another example is Cecchetti (2000), who shows that while “the primary objective 
of many central banks is to stabilize prices”, “including a role for output stabilization in central bank 
objectives seem prudent. The only issue is how important should it be relative to price stability when 
formulating the objective” (p. 49). As Mishkin (2008) shows “[t]he ultimate purpose of a central bank 
should be to promote the public good through policies that foster economic prosperity. Research in 
monetary economics describes this purpose by specifying monetary policy objectives in terms of stabilizing 
both inflation and economic activity” (p.1). 
Assuming economic (output) stability and price stability are two objectives of monetary policy, the 
policy maker’s choices in the short-run are analysed given aggregate disturbances in a standard textbook-
type (e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, Minford, 1992, Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen, 2005) short-run set-
up. Finally the question whether it is practicable to have a sole objective of price stability is asked, and 
answered in the negative. The price level can deviate from desired levels as a result of different types of 
aggregate disturbances. So, even if price stability is the foremost objective, the best monetary policy action 
depends on identifying the dominant aggregate disturbance of the time, because extreme policy may result 
in an even inferior outcome. The purpose of this paper is to drive home this conventional message using a 
simple model.  
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The Model 2 
To keep the analysis as simple as possible assume a closed economy with no government. Also the issues of 
lags, dynamics and rigidities are assumed away for simplicity3. The aggregate demand of the economy is 
given by the following relation:  
  (1) 
where yt is output, pt is price level, mt is current money stock and  is the aggregate demand 
disturbance. The aggregate demand disturbance here is assumed to be encompassed in changes to real 
money demand.4  
The aggregate supply schedule of the economy is given by a standard Lucas-type Phillips curve: 
   (2) 
 
where y* is the equilibrium output,  is the aggregate supply disturbance, E is the 
expectations operator, and  is the slope of the short run aggregate supply curve. If actual price 
equals expected price, then  unless disturbed by an aggregate supply shock.  
The nature of aggregate supply disturbances could vary from those highlighted in Wijewardena 
(2007) such as temporary changes to the supply of agricultural products or prices of imported goods and in 
Mishkin (2008) such as rise in relative energy prices having only a temporary effect on inflation, to shocks 
which may have a longer term impact on the economy such as shocks to productivity, as highlighted by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Blanchard (1989). 
As in Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), the reaction function of the monetary authority is given by: 
   (3) 
where the monetary authority is assumed to be able to observe price and output movements 
contemporaneously. Here  is a constant level of money stock, p* is an explicit or implicit price target, 
and are policy parameters attached to price stabilisation and output stabilisation, respectively. 
While being similar to a standard Taylor-type policy rule such as the ones that appear in Taylor (1999), 
equation (3) is defined in terms of monetary aggregates rather than interest rates, which is more appropriate 
to represent the conduct of monetary policy in Sri Lanka.  
Substitute the policy rule (3) into the aggregate demand function (1), and solve for yt to obtain: 
 (4) 
                                                          
2/ The model is in log-linear form. 
3/ Accounting for these issues, although providing a similar result as discussed in this paper, complicates the effects of disturbances. 
For instance, “when lags are taken into account, the conventional wisdom must be modified.” (Svensson, 1999, p.344, emphasis 
added)  
4/ The aggregate demand disturbance, , can also be shown as a disturbance to the reaction function of the central bank (equation 
3 below), and interpreted as the exogenous or surprise changes in monetary policy. Using a monetary policy index for Sri Lanka, 
Amarasekara (2008) shows that exogenous changes to monetary policy has been quite small compared to anticipated monetary 
policy changes. 
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Equate the aggregate supply equation (2) and (4) and solve for pt : 
  (5) 
Take expectations at time t-1 of (5) and solve for Et-1pt : 
   (6) 
Substitute (6) into (5) to obtain the reduced-form solution for pt : 
   (7) 
 
Equation (7) shows that at equilibrium aggregate price level equals expected price level given by (6), 
and any deviations are caused by only random disturbances  and .  
Substitute (7) into (4) and simplify to obtain the reduced-form output equation: 
   (8) 
According to equation (8), at equilibrium , and similar to equilibrium price, any deviation from 
the equilibrium is caused only by random disturbances  and . Equations (7) and (8) are the key 
equation used for the current analysis. 
Prices and Output under demand shocks 
Assuming that there are no supply disturbances, i.e., , equations (7) and (8) can be written as: 
 
  (9) 
   (10) 
Equations (9) and (10) show that a positive aggregate demand disturbance increases the price level as 
well as output. However, with demand disturbances, it matters less whether the policy maker cares more 
about price or output stabilisation. As the policy weight on price stabilisation or output stabilisation 
increase price level as well as output are brought back to the equilibrium.  
To make this point clearer, assuming a constant level of money ( ), an equilibrium growth 
rate of output of 5 percent ( ), an annual targeted growth in prices of 2 percent ( ), 
and Figure 5 plots policy scenarios following a demand disturbance normalised to 1. Figures 
5.3 and 5.5 (5.4 and 5.6) plot the behaviour of prices and output under demand shocks for alternative values 
of  ( ) holding  ( ) constant at 1. 
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Figure 5.1 and 5.2 confirm that as higher values are assumed for the policy parameters  and/or  
, both prices and output are stabilised. In figures 5.3 and 5.5, holding the other policy parameter 
constant a higher  or  results in , while as shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.6, increasing either 
 or  also results in . Therefore, a price-stabilising central bank is benefited by the added 
advantage of output stability when faced with a demand shock. As long as the central bank is actively 
reacting to changes in either prices or output from their target/equilibrium levels, monetary policy is 
successful in achieving “economic and price stability”. There is no conflict or trade-off between output 
stability and price stability. 
 
        
Figure 5.1         Figure 5.2 
 
Figure 5: Prices and Output under Demand Shocks and Different Policy Parameters 
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Fig 5.5         Fig 5.6 
 
Prices and Output under Supply Shocks 
Equating demand disturbances to zero in (7) and (8), equations (11) and (12) are obtained.  
 
  (11) 
   (12) 
 
Equations (11) and (12) display that in the face of aggregate supply disturbances prices and output 
move in opposite directions. As shown in Figure 6, a negative aggregate demand disturbance (  = -1) 
increases prices and reduces output in relation to their equilibrium/target values. Unlike with demand 
disturbances, it now matters whether the monetary authority aims at price stabilisation or output 
stabilisation.  
In Figure 6.1, increasing the policy weight on price stabilisation ( ) brings the price level back to 
the target, but when the policy weight on output stability ( ) is high prices deviate further from the 
target. Figure 6.2 shows that while increasing  reduces output further away from the equilibrium, 
increasing the policy weight on output stabilisation has the opposite effect where output approaches the 
equilibrium. These are further confirmed by Figures 6.3-6.6 where one policy parameter is held constant 
while the other is assumed different values. The policymaker is now faced a tradeoff between stabilising 
prices and output thus creating an ambiguity on the ability to achieve “economic and price stability” 
simultaneously.  
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Fig. 6: Prices and Output under Supply Shocks and Different Policy Parameters 
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Economic and Price stability – in terms of Variance 
Since stability is the keyword in modern monetary policy making it is useful to look at price and output 
stability in terms of variability or variance, as in Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005). Observing 
variances rather than levels have two obvious advantages. First, the constant terms in price or output 
equation does not play a role in the variance. Second, it does not matter whether the disturbances are 
negative or positive.  
The variances of price equation (7) and output equation (8) can be computed to be:  
  (13) 
  (14) 
 
Equations (13) and (14) show variances of prices ( ) and output ( ) to be functions of the 
variance of demand disturbances ( ), variance of supply disturbances ( ), and the covariance between 
demand and supply disturbances ( ). Lower the variance, the higher the stability of prices and output. 
 
Price and Output Stability under demand shocks 
Again isolating demand shocks equations (13) and (14) reduce to: 
  (15) 
  (16) 
 
Similar to section (4), in the face of demand shocks, whether the monetary authority stabilises prices 
or output does not matter much as more active monetary policy reduces both price and output variability 
simultaneously. A price-stabilising central bank does not face a policy trade-off in this case. Also 
noticeable is that, for the parameter values assumed here, increasing  reduces both price and output 
variability at a greater rate than the effect of a higher . 
 
 
 
Central Bank Objectives and Aggregate Disturbances 
 5151
Fig. 7: Price and Output stability under Demand Shocks and Different Policy Parameters 
         
Figure 7.1         Figure 7.2 
    
Figure 7.3         Figure 7.4 
    
Figure 7.5         Figure 7.6 
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Price and Output Stability under supply shocks 
With reference to supply shocks only, equations (13) and (14) can be written as: 
  (17) 
   (18) 
 
Again it is observed that increasing the policy weight on price stabilisation indeed reduces the 
variance of price level while increasing the policy weight on output stabilisation increases the variance of 
price level. With regard to the variance of output it has the opposite effect. Therefore, as discussed earlier 
the presence of supply shocks presents the challenge of a policy trade-off to a monetary authority.  
As shown in Figure 8.1, when  is low, variability of prices is low, and increasing  slightly 
reduces price variability further. Figure 8.2 displays that this is at the cost of increasing output variability. 
Holding one policy weight constant, Figures 8.3-8.6 lends further support to this trade-off. 
 
Fig. 8: Price and Output stability under Supply Shocks and Different Policy Parameters 
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Figure 8.3         Figure 8.4 
    
Figure 8.5         Figure 8.6 
Optimal Monetary Policy 
Having discussed the effects of the type of the shock that the economy is faced with have on monetary 
policy making, let us now look at the loss function of a central bank. As in Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) 
and Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006), a standard “quadratic loss function where policymaker 
seeks to minimise the sum of squared deviations or output and prices from their target paths” is assumed 
here: 
   (19) 
where the central bank’s overall objective is to minimise the loss given by (19) and  is the central bank’s 
“relative aversion to inflation variability” (Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 1999).  
In terms of variance, equation (19) can be written as: 
  (20) 
As in Guender and Gillmore (2010) and assuming independently and identically distributed shocks 
(i.e., ), and substituting (13) and (14) into (20): 
         (21) 
 
Differentiating the loss function with respect to the policy weight  results in: 
 
Minimising the loss function, i.e., equating (22) to zero, and solving for  provides the optimal 
policy weight on price stabilisation that the central bank should assume given both demand and supply 
disturbances and given preferences of the central bank as shown in equation (23): 
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   (23) 
The optimal policy weight on price stabilisation as given in equation (23) is dependent on the policy 
weight on output stabilisation ( ), slope of the aggregate supply equation ( ), the relative preference of 
the central bank of price stability ( ), and also the ratio of the variances of shocks faced by the economy (
/ ), thus complicating monetary policymaking. Higher the occurrence of demand disturbances in the 
economy, higher the optimal policy weight on price stabilisation, while higher the occurrence of supply 
disturbances, lower will be the optimal policy weight on price stabilisation. 
A central bank which is solely concerned about price stability (α = 1), will assume an extremely high 
(∞) value for Øp irrespective of the shocks faced by the economy, thus stabilising prices at any cost to 
output. However, this is merely a hypothetical scenario and no central bank can ever ignore the impact of 
such extreme policy on the real economy and the society’s welfare, so the preferences of a typical central 
bank are marked by a high  α  but never α = 1 i.e., always a combination of “economic stability” and “price 
stability”. As Svensson (2000) argues succinctly with reference to inflation targeting: “[w]hereas there may 
previously have been some controversy about whether inflation targeting involves concern about real 
variability, there is now considerable agreement in the literature that this is indeed the case: Inflation-
targeting central banks are not what King (1997) referred to as “inflation nutters”” (p.6). Svensson further 
explains that “concern about output stability translates into a more gradualist policy” rather than diverting 
the central bank’s focus from price stability (also see Svensson, 1997, and Ball, 1999).  
In fact, while most modern central banks do recognize price stability as the core objective, quite often 
it is not recognised as the sole objective, or provisions are made for central banks to rethink the effects of 
their policies on the real economy. Examples are the Federal Reserve Act of 1977 which defined the 
monetary policy objective for the USA as “maintain[ing] long run growth of the monetary and credit 
aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote 
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”, and 
the Bank of England Act of 1998, which defines the objectives of the Bank of England as maintaining price 
stability, and “subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her majesty’s Government, including its 
objectives for growth and employment”. The objective of the European System of Central Banks is similar. 
While maintaining price stability is defined as the primary objective, “without prejudice to the objective of 
price stability” it is expected to support the objectives of the European Union which are maintaining “a 
high level of  employment and sustainable and non-inflationary growth”. Even the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, which is considered the best and foremost example for inflation targeting, while defining the 
primary objective being “achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices”, allows the 
government to “direct the Bank to formulate and implement monetary policy for any economic objective, 
other than the [price stability objective]” and “the Bank shall formulate and implement monetary policy in 
accordance with any [such] economic objective.” 
Summary and Conclusion 
The simple model utilised here reaffirms the conventional wisdom that the objectives of price stability and 
output stability are complementary when the economy is faced with demand shocks, but the policy maker 
faces a tradeoff between stabilising prices vis-à-vis output during supply disturbances. This theoretical 
implication is compatible with Sri Lanka’s experience as shown in Figures 3 and 4. Extreme policy may 
disturb the economic equilibrium further, so the best central banking policy can never totally ignore its 
effects on the real economy. Identifying the source of the disturbance is crucial to make best judgement as 
to the course of monetary policy to be pursued. 
Provided a central bank acts in the public interest, due to the nature of aggregate disturbances faced 
by an economy, it is best to leave room for the central bank to determine the best course of action to tackle 
the disturbances that hit the economy at a given time. As Blinder (1998) shows in the context of the Federal 
Reserve, “the goals of monetary policy are set forth in legislation but are sufficiently imprecise that they 
Central Bank Objectives and Aggregate Disturbances 
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require considerable interpretation by the central bank.....The so-called dual mandate requires the Fed to 
give tacit or explicit content to the vague phrases “maximum employment” and “stable prices” and then to 
decide how to deal with the short-run trade-off between the two. This interpretative role enhances the Fed’s 
de facto power, which is considerable” (p.54).  
In the final analysis, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka’s broader objective to maintain “economic and 
price stability” rather than restricting its mandate to “price stability” has granted it power to conduct better 
monetary policy in a global environment of uncertainty and various economic fluctuations. The objective 
also emphasises that the performance of the central bank must be assessed in line with the dominant 
aggregate disturbance faced by the economy at the time. This is what was recognised by Governor 
Jayawardena’s comment on “not falling into the trap of attempting to stabilise a price index” and Deputy 
Governor Wijewardena’s interpretation of pursuing the “macroeconomic equilibrium”. It is also essential to 
maintain a system of checks and balances to ensure whether this broader mandate is appropriately utilised 
to maintain, where necessary, a balance between economic and price stability in the short run, and to 
achieve price stability in the long run, which in turn is generally accepted as being conducive for long-run 
economic stability.  
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Data Appendix: 
All series are defined in logs and detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott Filter ( ) to obtain the 
gap/cycle series. All series are annual data. 
CPI: IMF International Financial Statistics Line 64...ZF CPI:COLOMBO 455 MNUAL WRKRFAM 
(2005=100) (Units: Index Number)  
GDP: IMF International Financial Statistics Line 99BVPZF  GDP VOL. (2005=100) (Units: Index 
Number) 
Broad Money: IMF International Financial Statistics Line 35L..ZF  MONEY PLUS QUASI-MONEY 
(Units: National Currency) (Scale: Millions) 
 
 
 
  
Central Bank of Sri Lanka International Research Conference - 2009 
 
 58
 
